Recurrent business cycles without shocks – the role of lumpy investments

The brilliant monetary economist Scott Freeman was one of the 1st to show the existence of real business cycles without the need of shocks to drive the ups and downs of the economy. He did this when taking time off from showing that much of the apparent correlation between the nominal and the real side of the economy is due to the endogenous response of money created by banks to fluctuations in real activity.

In 1999, Scott Freeman co-wrote Endogenous Cycles and Growth with Indivisible Technological Developments. The paper was about large, discrete technological improvements that required the accumulation of research or infrastructural investment over time before any benefits for realised in terms of increased output. With these lead-times for research or infrastructure investments, growth paths display cyclical patterns even in the absence of any shocks.

This lumpiness over time implied that a costly process such as research or construction must be completed on a large scale before the greatest part of a project’s benefits in output can be realized as Freeman and co. argue:

There are numerous examples of big research or infrastructural projects that are characterized by huge investments and relatively long development periods, where most of the benefits occur only after the project is complete.

Freeman and his co-authors gave as examples space research and satellite programs and major medical research. These are examples of prolonged and costly R & D whose benefits come primarily at the conclusion of the project.

Lags in the development of a new drug between the commencement of the R&D project and any revenues received is routinely now more than a decade. The Human Genome Project seems to be going on without end with few initial benefits.

Infrastructural examples given by Freeman and his co-authors included the installation of telephone, the internet, transportation shipping canals, interregional highways, railroads, mass transit or electricity transmission projects. All of these projects with long lead times, once completed that may increase the productivity of many economic sectors in addition to increasing output in the area concerned. In many cases there are no benefits whatsoever of the project and to after it is completed many years in the future. Oil pipelines can take up to a decade to build.

The 1973 oil price crisis launched a research and development program into alternative sources of energy and alternative sources of oil and gas supply that has lasted to this day.

Classic further examples of long lead times are mega sports events such as the World Cup and Olympic Games. Years of planning, development and construction for any benefits or revenues are obtained.

What is important in terms of the random shocks that drive the business cycle as championed by Ed Prescott is there are a range of sectors within the economy where there are long lead times before the investment leads to any outputs. Not surprisingly the first article in the real business cycle literature included in its title “time to build“.

Rabah Arezki, Valerie Ramey, and Liugang Sheng in “News Shocks in Open Economies: Evidence from Giant Oil Discoveries” explore a related theme of real business cycles without shocks. In particular, they investigate news of productivity enhancements. They look at what happens to economies that discover oil. An oil discovery is a well identified “news shock.”

An oil discovery is well publicised and creates an incentive to invest in oil drilling. More importantly, there is news of greater income in the future but no change in current labour productivity or technological opportunities.

Rabah,Valerie, and Liugang  found that after big oil discoveries, during the period of investment, the newly rich oil country borrows from abroad to build oil wells, oil pipelines and associated port infrastructure, obviously, but also borrows to finance higher consumption now. Consumption goes up and stays up in permanent income hypothesis fashion.

Interestingly, employment declines because of the wealth effect from the future income but there is no higher productivity of labour to encourage more work today. Investment rises soon after the news of the oil discovery arrives, while GDP does not increase for 5 years or more.

This is consistent with experience in the oil-rich Arab countries where there was increased consumption of leisure in anticipation of high future income is based on oil.

The same happened in Norway where massive investment was funded by foreign borrowing  that led to annual current account deficits of up to 15% of GDP. Domestic savings fell away because Norwegians anticipated higher future incomes and started spending some of it now as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. Norway now has a huge sovereign wealth fund able to fund a large part of its demographic burden from an ageing society.

After Mexico’s discovery of oil in the early 1970s, investment was high in oil and related industries. Consumption—by households and government—rose because of the increase in prospective real income.  Since real GDP was not yet high, Mexico  borrowed to pay for both the oil investment and the higher  current consumption. Mexico’s foreign debt increased from $3.5 billion or 9% of GDP in 1971 to $61 billion or 26% of GDP in 1981. This boom in consumption and investment occurred without any productivity shock. All that was required was the ability to borrow.

Once the oil comes on line, the economy concern exports oil and pays back debt. This is when GDP including oil production finally rises a good five years and often more after the oil discovery. Consumption continues for its previous high rates while investment falls as the oil wells and pipelines have been built.

As with Scott Freeman, the long lead times not only can lead to large swings in investment, lumpy investments can also lead to increases in consumption, savings and employment without any productivity shocks.

Keynesian macroeconomics postulated that the economy slips into recessions for all sorts of reasons such as shifts and turns in the animal spirits and a loss of consumer confidence leading to a fall in autonomous investment and autonomous consumption. A collapse in autonomous investment and autonomous consumption is the Keynesian explanation for the great depression.

Both Keynesian macroeconomics and real business cycle theories at least at the outset couldn’t explain why there were recessions. Both attributed to them to causes they were yet to explain.

Keynesian macroeconomics could not explain what drove the waves of optimism and pessimism that either sharply increased or reduced investment. At bottom, Keynesian macroeconomics makes an unjustified assumption that technological progress unfolds at a relatively smooth rate and it attributes volatility in the economy to fluctuations in investment unrelated to trends in productivity.

The  key inside of Keynesian macroeconomics was that inflation and unemployment were inversely correlated, so as one went up, the other went down as Milton Friedman explains.

Marvellously simple. A key that apparently unlocks the mystery of long-continued unemployment: inadequate autonomous spending or too low a propensity to consume. Increase either, or both, being careful simply not to go too far, and full employment could be attained.

What a wonderful prescription: for consumers, spend more out of your income, and your income will rise; for governments, spend more, and aggregate income will rise by a multiple of your additional spending; tax less, and consumers will spend more with the same result.

Though Keynes himself, and even more, his disciples, produced much more sophisticated and subtle versions of the theory, this simple version contains the essence of its great appeal to non-economists and especially governments.

A well-functioning economy should have no business cycles – no bouts of high inflation or persistent unemployment as Richard Rogerson explained:

So if there are cycles, that’s an indication of a malfunctioning economy. That idea permeated thinking for many years and was deeply ingrained. In effect, if an economy is in recession, someone should fix it.

The Keynesians only retreated as their empirical predictions were thoroughly discredited in the 1970s stagflation. Ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses were included about the supply-side in the Keynesian paradigm to prop up the old-time religion, not find new paths as Robert Barro put it:

image

At least Prescott and other real business cycle theorists accepted that they must eventually unpack productivity drops and name causes that can be explored further to be found persuasive or perhaps wanting. They argued that periods of temporarily low output growth need not be market failures, but could follow from temporarily slow improvements in production technologies.

As research progressed, real business cycles were viewed as recurrent fluctuations in an economy’s incomes, products, and factor inputs—especially labour—due to changes in technology, tax rates and government spending, tastes, government regulation, terms of trade, and energy prices.

image

Scott Freeman took this research further. He, his colleagues and his progeny showed that real business cycles can occur without any productivity rises and falls whatsoever. All that was needed was the ability to borrow and invest across time to finance lumpy investments. These lumpy investments can be anything from oil wells, dams to new drugs, anywhere involving time to build and capital accumulation:

image

HT: The Grumpy Economist: Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng on news shocks.

ABCT insights are predominantly a theory of unsustainable credit-induced booms

 

via What Austrian business cycle theory does and does not claim as true | Institute of Economic Affairs

Did fiscal austerity in 2010 have credible academic support?

Image

‏@sjwrenlewis The stimulus package ignored what we have learned in the last 60 years of macroeconomic research

Interview with Thomas Sargent | Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

.

Real and Pseudo-Financial Crises, the Chinese share market crash and Anna Schwartz

If we could take time out from the breathless journalism about the Chinese stock market, which some people may have heard of before this week, it’s crash should be seen through the lens that Anna Schwartz developed in 1987 of a pseudo financial crisis and a financial crisis.

Her paper is written at the same time as the 1987 stock market crash. On financial crises, Anna Schwartz said:

image

As for those pseudo financial crises, she said:

image

Schwartz’s principal concern with regard to pseudo financial crisis was:

proposals to deal with pseudo-financial crises is the perpetuation of policies that promote inflation and waste of economic resources

As we are talking about the Chinese stock market, Anna Schwartz also wrote about the concepts of real systemic international risk and and pseudo international systemic risk.

Once again, and as with pseudo financial crises and real financial crises, what distinguishes real systemic international risk and pseudo international systemic risk is a threat to the payment system. The threat of bank runs, which can easily be eliminated through lender of last resort facilities:

image

As always it is about the security of the payments system – of avoiding bank runs, not private losses:

image

The lesson for the day is that when people start panicking about the economy or the stock market or international markets, don’t go to a macroeconomist for advice, go to a monetary historian. They have seen it all before.

Sir Humphrey was right on why Britain entered the common market in 1973? Real GDP growth per working age British and French, PPP, detrended, 1950 – 2013

Figure 1: Real GDP per British and French aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1.9 per cent detrended, 1950-2013

image

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics

Figure 2: Real GDP per British and French aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1.9 per cent detrended, base 100 = 1974, 1950-2013

image

Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board, Total Database, January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/economics

In figure 2, a flat line represents annual real GDP growth at a rate of 1.9%, which is the trend rate of annual growth of the USA in the 20th century. A rising line means annual growth at above that trend rate; a falling line means annual growth at below that trend rate of 1.9% per year.

The three lags on monetary policy

There are large uncertainties about the size and timing of responses to changes in monetary policy. There is a close and regular relationship between the quantity of money and nominal income and prices over the years. However, the same relation is much looser from month to month, quarter to quarter and even year to year. Monetary changes take time to affect the economy and this time delay is itself highly variable. The lags on monetary policy are three in all:

  1. The lag between the need for action and the recognition of this need (the recognition lag)

  2. The lag between recognition and the taking of action (the legislation lag)

  3. the lag between action and its effects (the implementation lag)

These delays mean that is it difficult to ascertain whether the effects of monetary policy changes in the recent past have finished taking effect.

Secondly, it is difficult to ascertain when proposed changes in monetary policy will take effect. Thirdly, feedbacks must be assessed. The magnitude of the monetary adjustment necessary to deal with the problem at hand is never obvious.

It is common for a central bank to act incrementally. The central bank makes small adjustments to monetary conditions over time as more information is available on the state of the economy and forecasts are updated.

Most discussions on monetary policy focus on the implementation lag. This lag depends on the fundamental characteristics of the economy.

A long and variable implementation lag means that it is difficult for central banks to ascertain what is happening now or forecast what will happen. Central banks may stimulate the economy after it is well on the way to recovery and tighten monetary policy when the economy is already going into a recession.

In his classic A Program for Monetary Stability, published in 1959, Milton Friedman summarised his empirical findings on length and variability of the lags on monetary policy:

on the average of 18 cycles, peaks in the rate of change in the stock of money tend to preceded peaks in general business by about 16 months and troughs in the rate of change in the stock of money to precede troughs in general business by about 12 months. For individual cycles, the recorded lead has varied between 6 and 29 months at peaks and between 4 and 22 months at troughs.

With lags as variable as those estimated by Friedman, it is difficult to see how any policy maker could know which direction to adjust his policy, much less the precise magnitude needed. Long lags greatly complicate good forecasting. A forecaster cannot know what the state of the economy will be when his policy takes effect.

Many Keynesians, Friedman notes, advocate “leaning against the wind.” By this they mean, in some sense, that the monetary (and fiscal) authorities should try to balance out the private sector’s excesses rather than passively hope that it adjusts on its own.

Friedman tested the Fed’s success at leaning “against the wind” by checking whether the rate of money growth has truly been lower during expansions and higher during contractions. He admits that this method of grading he Fed’s performance is open to criticism, but decides to go ahead and see what turns up. He finds that Fed has – for the periods surveyed – been unsuccessful.

By this criterion, for eight peacetime reference cycles from March 1919 to April 1958. Actual policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 155 months, in the ‘wrong’ direction in 226 months; so actual policy was ‘better’ than the [constant 4% rate of money growth] rule in 41% of the months.

Nor is the objection that the inter-war period biased his study is good since Friedman found that:

For the period after World War II alone, the results were only slightly more favourable to actual policy according to this criterion: policy was in the ‘right’ direction in 71 months, in the ‘wrong’ direct in 79 months, so actual policy was better than the rule in 47% of the months. [2]

One of the best ways to parry a metaphor is with another metaphor. Keynesians have a host of metaphors in their rhetorical arsenal; one frequently voiced is that a wise government should “lean against the wind” when choosing policy. Friedman counters:

We seldom know which way the economic wind is blowing until several months after the event, yet to be effective, we need to know which way the wind is going to be blowing when the measures we take now will be effective, itself a variable date that may be a half year or a year or two from now. Leaning today against next year’s wind is hardly an easy task in the present state of meteorology.

By scrutinising the practice of monetary policy over the decades, Friedman manages to produce objections that both Keynesians and non-Keynesians must take seriously. A key part of any response to Friedman rests on the ability of forecasters to do their jobs with tolerable accuracy.

The most important aspect of monetary strategy is timing

The simplest statement to make about the lags in monetary policy is they are long and variable. This simple statement is also the key insight to understanding the actual implementation of monetary policy. Hence, how many months or years in advance must a central bank forecast to achieve its monetary goals? In 1994, the Economist said:

But [central banks] cannot afford to wait until inflation is actually rising before they act. Monetary policy does not change the speed of the economy instantly: it can take 18 months or more for a rise in interest rates to have its full impact on inflation. The target of policy ought therefore to be future not current inflation, in order to prevent a surge in 1996. The earlier interest rates are raised, the better the chances of engineering a smooth slowdown to a sustainable rate of growth before slack in the economy is exhausted.

Economists differ about the length of those lags. Uncertainty about the average length of those lags and the variability of those lags makes discretion most difficult. Activist policy can improve welfare only if the information about economic structure and economists’ ability to forecast is sufficiently accurate.

Early_sample

Friedman is the most famous and persuasive critic of Keynesianism on the grounds of lags. He has two main arguments: first, that there are “long and variable lags” between the identification of a problem and the effects of the designed remedy; second, that activist policy often itself becomes a source of instability since policy itself becomes a variable that the market must guess.

Friedman’s critique does not depend on the quantity theory of money. Keynesian policies do not necessarily follow even if the Keynesian theory of the business cycle were conclusively proved.

It must also be demonstrated that the government has the ability and willingness of the government to act as the theory prescribes. We are therefore further assuming that central banks have the incentive to stabilise the economy. If the government lacks the information required to stabilise the economy, issues of public choice incentives become fully redundant. Incentives to pursue an objective do not matter if the objective itself is unattainable.

Competing visions of central banking

Economics: A Million Mutinies Now, Part Two - feat. image

The competing visions of central banks over monetary policy have been defined by Franco Modiglani and Milton Friedman respectively. Modiglani considers the Keynesian vision of macroeconomic policy to be:

a market economy is subject to fluctuations which need to be corrected, can be corrected, and therefore should be corrected.

The Keynesian claim implies that central banks have sufficient knowledge of the structure of the economy to be able to choose the policy mix appropriate to a given set of circumstances. It is possible to target unemployment, interest rates and inflation in such a way that they can be maintained (and hence made predictable) by constant adjustment of policy instruments to new shocks.

The Keynesian approach assumes that the economy can slip into recessions for all sorts of reasons (Barro 1989). Business fluctuations result from shocks to aggregate demand. The principal source of these shocks are expectations induced shifts in investment demand. The role of the central bank is to make prompt, frequent policy responses to counteract this instability.

The task of government is to discover the particular monetary and fiscal polices which can eliminate shocks emanating from the private sector. A key finding of recent macroeconomic research is that anticipated monetary policy has very different effects to unanticipated monetary policy.

The Keynesian vision thus presuppose that government can foresee shocks which are invisible to the private sector but at the same time it is unable to reveal this advance information in a credible way and hence defusing the shock because it is no longer unanticipated. In addition, the counter cyclical monetary policies of governments must themselves be unforeseeable by private agents, but at the same time systematically related to the state of the economy (Lucas and Sargent 1979)

Of course, the Keynesian view of central banking is also premised on a goodwill theory of government. Governments pursue policies that are in the public interest. That is a public interest that is well-defined and is free of conflicts over income distribution, electoral success and power the could lead policy-makers to pursue goals other than full employment, stable prices and efficiency. Thus, if the latest forecast is a recession, additional stimulus is the usual prescription. However, since most Keynesian economists accept the permanent income and natural rate hypotheses, more stimulus implies less later at some unknown time.

Friedman’s vision of central banking is far more circumspect:

The central problem is not designing a highly sensitive [monetary] instrument that offsets instability introduced by other factors[in the economy], but preventing monetary arrangements becoming a primary source of instability (Milton Friedman 1959).

Friedman considers that a key element in the case for policy discretion is whether the sufficient information is available that can be used to reduce variability and assist the economy’s adjustment the unforeseen. A well intentioned policy-maker will destabilise if he is mislead by incomplete or incorrect information.

From the monetarist standpoint, price stability can be approximately attained under a well chosen and predictable monetary policy rule. Under this view, the unemployment and interest rates are unpredictable and can manipulated only at a prohibitive cost. The Keynesian and monetarist views are mutually incompatible and lead to very different policy recommendations (Lucas 1981).

Paul Samuelson on where he disagreed with Milton Friedman on macroeconomic policy

Paul Samuelson on where he disagreed with Milton Friedman

via Samuelson vs. Friedman, David Henderson | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty and An Interview With Paul Samuelson, Part One — The Atlantic.

After reading the annual reports of the Fed, Milton Friedman noticed the following pattern

Milton Friedman reading fed annual reports

.

The timing of major economic reform programmes

There are plenty of critics of deregulation, albeit enough for them are smart enough to realise they cannot restore the lost monopolies and high marginal tax rates on the middle-class. They admit in their hearts that deregulation and other economic reforms worked as did inflation targeting.

The common force behind economic reform from 1980 onwards was the growing deadweight welfare losses of the pre-1980s status quo.The pressure for reform came from the rising burden that increases in taxes and regulation placed on economic growth as evidenced by the 1970s productivity slowdown and stagflation.

George Stigler argued that ideas about economic reform need to wait for a market. As Stigler noted, when their day comes, economists seem to be the leaders of public opinion. But when the views of economists are not so congenial to the current requirements of special interest groups, these economists are left to be the writers of letters to the editor in provincial newspapers and run angry blogs.

Post-1980 trends in taxes, spending, and regulation in New Zealand and abroad reflect demographic shifts, more efficient taxes, more efficient spending, a shift in the political influence from the taxed to the subsidised, shifts in political influence among taxed groups, and shifts in political influence among the subsidised groups (Becker and Mulligan 1998, 2003).

The common forces behind economic reform across the OECD area have subtle implications for the size of the reform dividend for New Zealand

  • The deadweight losses of taxes, income transfers and regulation are a constraint on inefficient policies (Becker 1983, 1985; Peltzman 1989).
  • This deadweight loss is the difference between winner’s gains less the loser’s losses from a tax or regulation-induced change in output. Changes in behaviour due to taxes and regulation reduce output and investment.
  • Policies that significantly cut the total wealth available for distribution by governments are avoided because they reduce the payoff from taxes and regulation relative to the germane counter-factual, which are other even costlier modes of income redistribution (Becker 1983, 1985).

Certainly, in New Zealand, the post-1984 economic reforms followed a good 10 years of economic stagnation and regular economic crises.

In the early 1980s, New Zealand’s economy was in trouble. The country had lost its guaranteed export market when Britain joined the European Economic Union in 1973. The oil crisis that year had also taken a toll.

The Labour Party Minister of Finance, Sir Roger Douglas, prior coming to office in 1984, wrote a book called There’s Gotta Be A Better Way.

The rising deadweight cost of taxes and regulation due to technological change, and the dissipation of wealth through rising cost structures progressively enfeebled the subsidised groups, allowing others to win the initiative after the 1970s in many countries including New Zealand.

The Labour Government radically reduced the size and role of the state. It corporatised and restructured government departments, often in preparation for privatisation, and sold some state assets to private investors. It abolished many economic controls and removed farming subsidies.

The additional political pressure that the winners had to exert to keep the same dollar gain from income redistribution had to overcome rising pressure from the losers to escape their escalating losses.

Eventually, the fight was no longer worthwhile relative to the alternatives. Taxed, regulated and subsidised groups can find common ground in wealth enhancing policies and an encompassing interest in mitigating any reduction in wealth from income redistribution policies.

One barrier to reform is the transitional gains trap. The capitalisation of rents from taxi licenses is a classic example of the transitional gains trap.

Those who purchase the medallions from the owners at the time of initial regulation will pay the market rate for them and therefore will not receive any special rents.  Yet, they will fight to prevent the taxi medallion system from being eliminated, since these owners will be harmed by such elimination.  Thus, the city will be stuck with an inefficient medallion system that will be difficult to eliminate.

Eliminating the medallion program will harm existing taxis, many of whom did not lobby for the system in the first place and do not receive super competitive profits. The resources used in establishing the regulation or other programmes are lost forever.

Termination of a particular regulation or subsidies will nonetheless cause large capital losses for the incumbents. This will motivate incumbents to oppose reforms that jeopardise the income stream that has been previously capitalised (Tullock 1975; McCormick et al. 1984; Tollison and Wagner 1991). Any resources wasted in fighting economic reform must be deducted from the net gains from economic reform.

The literature on the transitional gains trap suggested that economic reform does not necessarily make society better off (Tullock 1975; McCormick et al. 1984; Tollison and Wagner 1991). The rent-seeking costs of the original privileges are capitalised and are lost forever. They are not regained by reform. The transitional gains trap is just a subset of a more general phenomenon indicating that deregulation can never replicate the status quo ante.

Too often it is assumed that deregulation can replicate the status quo ante. The prevailing model of deregulation is essentially a nirvana model, in that the gains from deregulation can essentially be had without cost. Further rent-seeking costs are incurred in lobbying for and against proposed reforms and these too are lost to forever.

The standard analysis of deregulation too easily treats reform as a return to the status quo ante. Fred McChesney observed

The airline industry of 1999 is not the airline industry of 1978 minus the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The wealth lost in rent seeking is not recovered, or even recoverable by deregulation. Production possibilities have been irretrievably diminished (McCormick et al. 1984; Tollison and Wagner 1991).

Reform is not a free lunch. To the extent that specialised resources were involved in the rent seeking–resources that could have been devoted to amassing specific capital in producing the regulated good–the deregulated relative price must be higher than the pre-regulation or competitive price. The abstract of the relevant article by Tollison and Wagner is as follows:

This paper applies the theory of rent seeking to argue that economic reform, in the sense of correcting past deformities in the economy, does not pay from a social point of view. Economic reform, at best, should focus on the prevention of future deformities.

The analysis is developed in terms of the example of monopoly, but its applicability extends to any example of economic reform. The general principle underlying the analysis is that reform is not a free lunch, all the more so when the costs of the reformer and the resistance of the object of reform are taken into account.

Despite this, new institutions arise when social groups notice opportunities for new gains which are impossible to realise under the prevailing institutional arrangements (Diana Thomas 2009). The chances that new institutional frameworks may develop increase when these alternative technological opportunities and export markets become available.

Reform is more likely when the net benefits of reform become large because there is plenty left over for credible compensation of the losers who could block change (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Acemoglu 2008). An example is if taxes or regulation causes cost padding or delay new technologies. Shedding these inefficiencies are potential benefits for all.

The political secret of the East Asian economic miracles was the focus on export led industrialisation. Because the new industries were exporting rather than entering and competing with domestic suppliers to home markets, these domestic special interest groups had no reason to lobby against the establishment of these export industries and otherwise blocked both their entry and the adoption of new technologies. The social change is much more subtle. The local industry is simply had to pay more for contract as the export industries grew and bid away their labour force with higher pay.

Successful subsidised groups are often coalitions of sub-sets of producers, consumers, employees and input suppliers and deregulation is always a possibility if some members can benefit from joining another coalition (Peltzman 1976, 1989). A surprising number of incumbents of regulated and state-owned industries were unprofitable – some close to bankruptcy – because of rising cost structures, the growing losses from mandated services and erosion of rents through non-price competition with existing firms. They would have closed anyway but for bailouts.

The economic reforms that picked up pace around 1980 were a success as Andrei Shleifer’s paper
The Age of Milton Freedom begins

The last quarter century has witnessed remarkable progress of mankind. The world’s per capita inflation-adjusted income rose from $5400 in 1980 to $8500 in 2005.Schooling and life expectancy grew rapidly, while infant mortality and poverty fell just as fast.

Compared to 1980, many more countries in the world are democratic today. The last quarter century also saw wide acceptance of free market policies in both rich and poor countries: from private ownership, to free trade, to responsible budgets, to lower taxes.

Milton Friedman on the impact of brute experience on central bankers

Image

Milton Friedman on pre-Keynesian macroeconomics

Image

Milton Friedman on the monetarist triumph

Image

Previous Older Entries Next Newer Entries

David Andolfatto

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Monetary Non-Neutrality

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Reason Magazine

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Coyote Blog

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Thoughts from the North

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Fardels Bear

A History of the Alt-Right

Vincent Geloso

Econ Prof at George Mason University, Economic Historian, Québécois

Bassett, Brash & Hide

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Truth on the Market

Scholarly commentary on law, economics, and more

The Undercover Historian

Beatrice Cherrier's blog

Matua Kahurangi

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Temple of Sociology

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Velvet Glove, Iron Fist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Why Evolution Is True

Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.

NoTricksZone

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Homepaddock

A rural perspective with a blue tint by Ele Ludemann

Kiwiblog

DPF's Kiwiblog - Fomenting Happy Mischief since 2003

The Dangerous Economist

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Watts Up With That?

The world's most viewed site on global warming and climate change

The Logical Place

Tim Harding's writings on rationality, informal logic and skepticism

Doc's Books

A window into Doc Freiberger's library

The Risk-Monger

Let's examine hard decisions!

Uneasy Money

Commentary on monetary policy in the spirit of R. G. Hawtrey

Barrie Saunders

Thoughts on public policy and the media

Liberty Scott

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Point of Order

Politics and the economy

James Bowden's Blog

A blog (primarily) on Canadian and Commonwealth political history and institutions

Science Matters

Reading between the lines, and underneath the hype.

Peter Winsley

Economics, and such stuff as dreams are made on

A Venerable Puzzle

"The British constitution has always been puzzling, and always will be." --Queen Elizabeth II

The Antiplanner

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

Bet On It

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

History of Sorts

WORLD WAR II, MUSIC, HISTORY, HOLOCAUST

Roger Pielke Jr.

Undisciplined scholar, recovering academic

Offsetting Behaviour

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

JONATHAN TURLEY

Res ipsa loquitur - The thing itself speaks

Conversable Economist

In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”

The Victorian Commons

Researching the House of Commons, 1832-1868

The History of Parliament

Articles and research from the History of Parliament Trust

Books & Boots

Reflections on books and art

Legal History Miscellany

Posts on the History of Law, Crime, and Justice

Sex, Drugs and Economics

Celebrating humanity's flourishing through the spread of capitalism and the rule of law

European Royal History

Exploring the Monarchs of Europe

Tallbloke's Talkshop

Cutting edge science you can dice with

Marginal REVOLUTION

Small Steps Toward A Much Better World

NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE KNOW THAT

“We do not believe any group of men adequate enough or wise enough to operate without scrutiny or without criticism. We know that the only way to avoid error is to detect it, that the only way to detect it is to be free to inquire. We know that in secrecy error undetected will flourish and subvert”. - J Robert Oppenheimer.