Recall and waiting unemployment
04 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in business cycles, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, occupational choice, unemployment Tags: recall unemployment, rest unemployment, temporary layoffs, waiting unemployment, work for the dole
Time use surveys in a range of countries show that the unemployed spend maybe a few hours per week looking for a new job. Krueger and Mueller (2008) found that:
…average search time is highest in the U.S.A., at 32.3 minutes per day, closely followed by Canada.
Europeans search much less, but there is considerable variation across countries.
In France the unemployed search around 21 minutes a day compared with 3 minutes in Finland
A small amount of job search per week is rational for many of the unemployed because a major form of job search doesn’t involve any job search any time soon. Instead, they are waiting for a call.
Also, Anglo-Saxon labour market are much more dynamic with many more vacancies opening every month as compared with the Eurosclerosis dual labour markets. In the European Union’s dual labour markets, it is not rational to search for vacancies that will never be there.
Job searches is an entrepreneurial venture that can involve a considerable amount of biding your time. Job seekers must choose between wider job search that may involve switching to a new industry or new occupation and investing in availability for suitable vacancies in their local labour markets or a recall to employment by old employers.
A spell of unemployment followed by a rehire by an old employer is known as recall unemployment or a temporary layoff.
Demand is less stable and more seasonal in industries such as construction, manufacturing and agriculture. When demand rebounds, recalling an old employee is a faster and cheaper hiring process than screening unfamiliar applicants of uncertain quality and training recruits.
Recall is not certain. Temporary layoffs will forecast their chances of recall and review these forecasts as they discover more about the length of drop in local labour demand and the general state of the rest of the labour market. the majority of unemployed who regard themselves as temporary layoffs are indeed recalled to their old job by their old employer after most downturns.
Better prospects of recall by old employers will reduce the intensity of job searches of temporary layoffs and increase their asking wages for other jobs. Workers with considerable industry and firm-specific human capital are likely to risk waiting longer for recall. Workers will search more intensively for other jobs as their forecasts of their chances of recall to old jobs become less encouraging.
There are more temporary layoffs in milder recessions because the lull in demand is expected to be short and there are fewer business closures. The higher levels of recall unemployment will reduce downward pressure on asking wages and slow the filling of vacancies because many well qualified job applicants are waiting for recall to their old jobs rather than applying more widely for new jobs.
Dixon and Crichton (2006) found that 58% of New Zealand benefit-to-work transitions involved starting with a new employer, 30% continued with an employer for whom they worked part-time in the benefit spell and 12% returned to an employer they had worked for in the past 2 years. The prospect of a recall by an old employer has been important for unemployed workers in countries such as the US, Canada, Demark, Sweden, Austria and Norway.
In the context of work-for-the-dole schemes and activation programmes that involve intensive monitoring of job search by the unemployed on unemployment benefits, requiring workers who are temporarily laid off to search for jobs is in many ways counter-productive.
Developing a screening mechanism to find these temporary layoffs and distinguishing them from permanent layoffs would be quite challenging. Countries which have unemployment insurance premiums spend a lot of try trying to adjust those premiums for temporary layoffs. This is so employers and employees do not take advantage of unemployment insurance to have a week or two off work in slack periods at the expense of the unemployment insurance system and top up their wages in the interim.
A cousin of recall unemployment is rest unemployment or waiting unemployment – job seekers who are waiting for conditions in a depressed sector to improve (Hamilton 1988; Alvarez and Shimer 2008).
Some job seekers may wait for local labour market conditions to improve, rather than search for jobs in other industries and new occupations. A job seeker’s old industry may offer better wage and job finding prospects than other industries If the newly unemployed worker waits a while.
Rest unemployment or waiting unemployment strives to salvage as much of the occupation and industry-specific human capital of the newly unemployed worker as possible.
A significant share of job seekers have been found to be waiting for local labour market conditions to improve rather than searching further afield in different industries or new occupations (Alvarez and Shimer 2008).
Again, rest unemployment or waiting unemployment is a type of job search that cannot be well handled by work-for-the-dole schemes and intensive monitoring of the job search of unemployed workers.
Job finding rates under work for the dole when there is involuntary unemployment
03 Aug 2014 6 Comments
in business cycles, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, welfare reform Tags: Active labour market programs, Jeff Borland, mandatory work requirements, search and matching, welfare reform, work for the dole
Jeff Borland is a critic of work for the dole. He points out that they do not improve the job finding rates of participants and in fact reduce the amount of job search because work for the Dole participants are busy undertaking work for the dole requirements:
The main reason is that participation in the program diverts participants from job seeking activity towards Work for the Dole activity. Research on similar programs internationally has come up with comparable findings.
This made me wonder. If unemployment is caused by deficient aggregate demand, and otherwise is involuntary, how can work for the dole increase unemployment or reduce the rate at which people exit unemployment?
‘Involuntary’ unemployment occurs when all those willing and able to work at the given real wage but no job is available, i.e. the economy is below full employment. A worker is ‘involuntary’ unemployment if he or she would accept a job at the given real wage. Keynesians believe money wages are slow to adjust (e.g. due to money illusion, fixed contracts or because employers and employees want long run money wage stability), and so the real wage may no adjust to clear the labour market: there can be ‘involuntary’ unemployment.
Under the deficient aggregate demand theory of unemployment, people have no control over why they are unemployed – that’s why their unemployment is involuntary.
Sticky wages are no less sticky when work for the dole is introduced and people search more intensively for jobs. Deficient demand unemployment is no less deficient when there is an increase in job search intensity.
Work for the dole must be carefully defined, of course, to differentiate it from the failed active labour market programs of the past that attempted to improve the employability of the unemployed. By work for the dole, I simply mean mandatory work requirements simply make it more of an ordeal to be on unemployment and thereby encourage people to find a job.
Mandatory work requirements simply tax leisure. By taxing leisure, mandatory work requirements change the work leisure trade-off between unemployment and seeking a job with greater zeal and a lower asking wage more attractive option. More applicants asking for lower wages will mean employers can fill jobs faster and at lower wages, which means our create more jobs in the first place.
The probability of finding a job for an unemployed worker depends on how hard this individual searches and how many jobs are available: Chance of Finding Job = Search Effort x Job Availability
Both the search effort of the unemployed and job creation decisions by employers are potentially affected by unemployment benefit generosity and mandatory work for welfare benefits requirements.
Modern theory of the labour market, based on Mortensen and Pissarides provides that more generous unemployment benefits put upward pressure on wages the unemployed seek. If wages go up, holding worker productivity constant, the amount left to cover the cost of job creation by firms declines, leading to a decline in job creation.
Everything else equal under the labour macroeconomics workhorse search and matching model of the labour market, reducing the rewards of being unemployed exerts downward pressure on the equilibrium wage. This fall in asking wages increases the profits employers receive from filled jobs, leading to more vacancy creation. More vacancies imply a higher finding rate for workers, which leads to less unemployment. The vacancy creation decision is based on comparing the cost of creating a job to the profits the firm expects to obtain from hiring the worker.
When unemployment benefits are less generous or more onerous work requirements are attached, some of the unemployed will become less choosey about the jobs they seek in the wages they will accept. a number of people at the margin between working or not. An example is commuting distance to jobs. A number of people turn down a job because is just that little too far to commute. A small change in the cost of accepting that job would have resulted in them moving from being unemployed to fully employed.
Unemployment is easy to explain in modern labour macroeconomics: it takes time for a job seeker to find a suitable job with a firm that wishes to hire him or her; it takes time for a firm to fill a vacancy. Search is required on both sides of the labour market – there are always would-be workers searching for jobs, and firms searching for workers to fill vacancies.
In a recession, a large number of jobs are destroyed at the same time. It takes time for these unemployed workers to be reallocated new jobs. It takes time for firms to find where it is profitable to create new jobs and find workers suitable to fill these new jobs.
Recessions are reorganisations. Unemployed workers look for jobs, and firms open vacancies to maximize their profits. Matching unemployed workers with new firms firms is a time-consuming and costly process.
Stephen Williamson on Marginal Taxation
03 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, fiscal policy, income redistribution, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Public Choice Tags: envy, Stephen Williamson, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and human capital, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, top 1%
He says a lot. I’ll try to address piece by piece.
Next, some people have shown interest in this paper by Diamond and Saez. A key result that seemed to get these people excited is the calculation of a top optimal marginal tax rate (including all taxes) of 73%, relative to the current rate of 42.5%. There are two key assumptions that Diamond and Saez make to come up with the 73% optimal rate. First, we should not care about the welfare (at the margin) of the rich people. This argument is based solely on the notion that marginal utility of income is low for the top income-earners. Second, Diamond and Saez use a “behavioral elasticity” of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate of 0.25. To see how this matters, if you use their formula and an elasticity of one, you get an optimal top tax rate…
View original post 1,215 more words
Most fiscal stimulus arguments ignore basic facts
02 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics Tags: crowding out, fiscal deficits, John Cochrane, Ricardian equivalence
The
The puzzlingly large cross country differences in sector labour productivity
02 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, entrepreneurship, macroeconomics Tags: barriers to riches, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, relative labour productivity, USA
There are large productivity differences between the global industrial leaders at the industry level. In a 1993 McKinsey’s study, large differences were uncovered in value added per worker between the USA, Japan, France, the UK and Germany across individual industries, by a factor of three in some cases (Prescott and Parente 2000, 2005).
- The USA competes with Japan for productivity leadership in many manufacturing industries.
- The Japanese services sector productivity can be as little as a one-third of that of the USA. Japanese labour productivity is almost twice Germany’s in producing automobiles and is better that Germany by a large margin for many other manufactured goods.
- The USA is uniformly more productive in services sector labour productivity. For example, British, French and German telecom workers were 38 to 56 per cent as productive as their American counter-parts.
Figure 1: Relative Value Added Per Worker: Germany, Japan, and the United States Manufacturer’s Industries
| Industry | Japan | Germany |
| Automobiles | 116 | 66 |
| Automobile Parts | 124 | 76 |
| Metal Working | 119 | 100 |
| Steel | 145 | 100 |
| Computer | 95 | 89 |
| Consumer Electronics | 115 | 62 |
| Food | 33 | 76 |
| Beer | 69 | 44 |
| Soap and Detergent | 94 | 76 |
Differences in the access to the global pool of useful knowledge cannot explain such large productivity differences at the sector and the individual industry levels between the USA, Japan, France, the UK and Germany and between these three European neighbours. The stock of useful technological knowledge does not vary that much across these countries (Prescott and Parente 2000, 2005). These countries produce and are the markets for the majority of that knowledge.
Figure 2: Relative Value Added Per Worker – service industries
| Industry | Japan | Germany | U.K. | France |
| Retailing | 44 | 96 | 82 | 69 |
| Telecommunications | 66 | 50 | 38 | 56 |
| Banking | – | 68 | 64 | – |
Lags in technology diffusion cannot be important. The USA, Japan, France, the UK, and Germany define the global technological frontier.
Differences in the skills of the individual worker or in the total stock of human capital of all workers in a country cannot explain these differences in value added per worker. The USA, Japan, France, the UK and Germany all have relatively well-educated, experienced and tested labour forces. For example, the 1993 McKinsey’s study inquired into the education and skills levels of Japanese and German steel workers. Comparably skilled German steel workers were half as productive as their Japanese counterparts (Prescott and Parente 2000, 2005).
What differ between these countries at the glob technological frontier is the amount of the global pool of useful productive of knowledge that is used and as work practices. Ford Europe failed to adopt Japanese just-in-time production, but Ford U.S.A. has adopted it. In the beer industry, much of the high technology machinery in Japan and U.S. is manufactured in Germany but German breweries fail to use these more productive technologies. The less productive airline sector in Europe vis-à-vis the United States is the result of over-staffing.
The contribution of the random fortunes of large firms to business cycle volatility, or how a single, small, dirty pipe threatened to bring a nation to its knees
02 Aug 2014 Leave a comment
in business cycles, macroeconomics Tags: Fonterra, real business cycle theory
One contaminated pipe at a milk processing factory of New Zealand’s largest company, Fonterra, New Zealand’s largest company (7% of GDP) and largest exporter caused such a loss of brand-name value of the company that the New Zealand Treasury revised down its GDP forecasts for the year.
It is a little bit scary to wonder what kind of nation we live in when a single, small, dirty pipe threatens to bring the nation to its knees. That indeed was the fear when, over the weekend, Fonterra announced the contamination of a small amount of whey powder from a Waikato processing plant – Bank of New Zealand
This growth forecast revision after the milk contamination scandal, but turn out to be false reading, is a good example of how the random fortunes of individual large companies can have economy-wide implications and can even lead to recessions.
Figure 1: Sector’s concentration (Herfindahl Index) and sector’s contribution to aggregate volatility
Source: (Gabaix 2011).
There is growing evidence that idiosyncratic shocks to the fortunes of the 100 largest firms arising from changes in demand and cost conditions in their local and export markets combine to contribute about one-third of up-swings and downswings in U.S. output and employment (Gabaix 2011).
In an economy dominated by a few large firms, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms do not cancel out. The ups and downs in the individual fortunes of very large firms combine with firm-to-firm linkages to travel far beyond the firm and sector of origin (Gabaix 2011). These effects are likely to be stronger outside of the USA because it has a more diversified economy than most countries (Gabaix 2011).
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) found that having fewer and less diversified firms and exports dominated by large firms helps to explain why small, more open economies such as New Zealand are more volatile. Fonterra accounts for 7 per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of overall exports. Drought is important to the New Zealand business cycle and agricultural exports (Buckle, Kim, Kirkham, McLellan and Sharma 2007).
As another example of the importance of a few large firms, Samsung and Hyundai account for 35 per cent of Korean exports and 22 per cent of Korean GDP.It would not be a good idea for the chief executives of those two Korean businesses to travel in the same car and have an accident.
Finland was monikered the one-firm economy because Nokia was responsible for 1/5th of Finnish economic growth, exports and company tax revenues for two decades. Nokia shares initially fell by 90 per cent in 2007 when Apple leap-frogged it with an iPhone that resembled a PC. The loss of one product development race imperilled the foundation of one-fifth of Finnish economic growth.
The literature on the contribution of large firms to business cycle volatility is a good examples of how the real business cycle theory is alive and well and is a progressive research programme.
Keynesian analysis implicitly assumes that a fiscal deficit does not have any effects on other spending
01 Aug 2014 1 Comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, Milton Friedman, monetarism Tags: budget deficits, fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus, Milton Friedman
The
Eugene Fama and the simulative effects of fiscal policy
31 Jul 2014 6 Comments
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, great depression, great recession, macroeconomics Tags: crowding out, Eugene Fama, fiscal policy, Treasury view of fiscal policy
Eugene Fama argues that government bailouts and stimulus plans seem attractive when there are idle resources – when there is unemployment such as in a recession or depression including in the 1930s.
Fama counters that:
1. Bailouts and stimulus plans must be financed.
2. If the financing takes the form of additional government debt, the added debt displaces other uses of the funds.
3. Thus, stimulus plans only enhance incomes when they move resources from less productive to more productive uses.
In the end, despite the existence of idle resources, bailouts and stimulus plans do not add to current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another.
Fama noted that there was just one valid negative comment in response to this argument that appears to be valid which was made by Brad DeLong.
Fama thinks Delong’s point about involuntary inventory accumulation is consistent with Fama’s initial arguments about the need for the stimulus to work through moving resources to higher value uses.
For me, the notion that a fiscal stimulus is a negative productivity shock is a good starting point for analysis. The method of financing the stimulus is important too.
Economic agents know that a temporary expenditure program has no lasting effect on employment but has lasting effect on disposable income and taxes. Indeed, massive public interventions to maintain employment and investment during a financial crisis can, if they distort incentives enough, lead to a depression.
In Australia, there was a massive fiscal contraction from late 1930 onwards called the Premiers’ Plan. In 1931, unemployment rates was 25% or more.
- The Premiers’ Plan required the federal and state governments to cut spending by 20%, including cuts to wages and pensions and was to be accompanied by tax increases, reductions in interest on bank deposits and a 22.5% reduction in the interest the government paid on internal loans.
- The Premiers’ Plan was complementary to the Arbitration Court’s 10 per cent nominal wage cut in January 1931 and the devaluation of the Australian pound. Most countries had abandoned the gold standard by 1931 and 1932 and devalued by about 10% including the UK. These competitive devaluations were called currency wars. Most countries below started to recovery before they left the gold standard, a year or two before they left the cross of gold.
Maclaren (1936) dated the Australian economic recovery from the last months of 1932. It was to take another three years before unemployment rates fell below 10 per cent — the rate it had been during most of the 1920s.
The June 1931 Premiers’ Plan of fiscal consolidation had time by late 1932 to become credible and take hold given the usual leads and lag on fiscal policy. Unemployment data for the time show a rapid fall in the high twenties unemployment rate in 1932 to be below 10 per cent by 1937.
“Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon”
31 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in budget deficits, fiscal policy, macroeconomics, monetarism, monetary economics Tags: Joan Robinson
Joan Robinson thought German hyperinflation was not caused by monetary policy!!
Almost, but not quite.
Back in the days when dinosaurs roamed the earth, and Cambridge economists kept guard at the Temple of Keynes, Milton Friedman’s focus on inflation as a monetary phenomenon was a revelation—and an excellent one. Next to Joan Robinson’s surreal claims that printing money was not responsible for the German hyperinflation, Friedman’s version of monetary economics provided a very healthy dose of sanity. And as central banks across the world learned from the mistakes of the 70s and brought inflation under control, it became clear that the monetary authority indeed had the power to contain the price level via control of the money supply.
But it’s important to know what this account leaves out: how, exactly, do prices adjust? And over what length of time does this happen?
The modern view, backed up by impressive (though not entirely conclusive) empirical evidence, is that most prices are…
View original post 301 more words
Hayek on Keynes and the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomics
31 Jul 2014 9 Comments
in applied price theory, F.A. Hayek, macroeconomics Tags: FA Hayek, Keynes, the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic
HT: Cafe Hayek
Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy.
31 Jul 2014 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, fiscal policy, job search and matching, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, welfare reform Tags: Active labour market programs, Lars Calmfors, welfare reform, work for the dole, workfare
Lars Calmfors is a Swedish economist whose main interest is labour makets.
His iron law of Active Labour Market Policy (ALMP) refers to a characteristic of make work schemes, like the WPA that operated in the United States in the 1930s.
The characteristic or problem with these schemes is that if people are attracted to these schemes by generous pay or conditions, their motive to search for regular work is necessarily reduced.
Assuming unemployment is anywhere near NAIRU, the effect of this reduced aggregate labour supply will be inflationary, which means that demand will have to be reduced, which in turn means that the jobs created by the make work scheme will be, at least to some extent, at the expense of regular jobs.
Alternatively, if people are coerced into joining make work schemes because of what might be called a “workfare” sanction, their job search efforts are not reduced, thus the jobs created by the make work scheme have a better chance of not being at the expense of normal jobs.
via RALPHONOMICS: Calmfor’s Iron Law of Active Labour Market Policy..
Will work-for-the-dole work in Australia?
29 Jul 2014 12 Comments
in labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, unemployment, welfare reform Tags: benefit exhaustion spike, search and matching, unemployment insurance, US welfare reforms, welfare reform
One of the strongest empirical findings of modern labour economics is the benefit exhaustion spike. This is the large increase, shown in the diagram, in the probability of finding a job on the eve of exhausting unemployment benefits or unemployment insurance eligibility.
This benefit exhaustion spike is mobile: when unemployment insurance eligibility is lengthened, the benefit exhaustion spike moves out to the new benefit exhaustion date. For example, from 26 weeks, then to 39 weeks, then 52 weeks and then to 99 weeks. There is also a benefit exhaustion spike where the generosity of unemployment or other insurance decreases after a certain time. The alleged decay in the human capital of the long-term unemployed does not seem to affect this benefit exhaustion spike.
In addition, in the EU, the job finding probability of unemployment insurance recipients eligible for other welfare schemes are less sensitive to changes in the level and duration of their unemployment benefits benefits.
The benefit exhaustion spike shows that job seekers have much more control over their re-employment prospects than is commonly granted even in the worst of economic conditions such as in Pittsburgh in the early 1980s in a major recession and when US manufacturing industry industry was in a long-term decline.
The individual’s reservation wage (i.e. the lowest wage wage at which individuals will accept a job offer) decreases whilst search intensity increases as they approach unemployment benefit eligibility exhaustion.
This reduction in reservation wages or the asking wages of job seekers increases the incentives for employers to post new vacancies because they can fill them at a lower cost. Both more intensive job search and more vacancies will see jobs filled faster, and more jobs created and filled.
A mechanism for reducing welfare programme entry rate while increasing welfare benefit exits is mandatory minimum job search and mandatory work requirements such as those proposed this week for Australia. These minimum hours can be spent working part time, in study and training, work preparation and job search assistance or volunteering. A work requirement is a screening device that removes any advantage of moving on to welfare in terms of more leisure time.
The proposals announced this week in Australia are most job seekers will be required to look for up to 40 jobs per month and work for the dole will be mandatory for all jobseekers younger than 50. Job seekers younger than 30 would have to work 25 hours a week under the expanded programme, while those between 30 and 49 will be asked to do 15 hours work a week, and those aged 50-60, 15 hours a week.
At least 13 OECD member countries require at least monthly visits to a local employment office by unemployment beneficiaries to present job-search evidence and also perhaps to receive advice and even referrals to specific job openings.
Reforms in a range of overseas countries that introduced more intensive monitoring of job search and stronger sanctions on benefits for non-compliance significantly reduced unemployment spells.
One of the surprising results of more intensive monitoring of job search and a requirement to sign on regularly at the local employment office or Social Security office is the sheer horror of having to sign-on and talk to caseworker for five minutes encourages 5 to 10% of unemployed beneficiaries to find a job. When unemployment and sickness beneficiaries are required to undergo a full reassessment of their eligibility, it is common for up to 30% of them simply to not reapply.
The stronger monitoring of job search and the real prospect of stiffer sanctions for non-compliance encourages all benefit claimants, current and future, and not just those actually sanctioned to search harder for jobs. This anticipation of stricter monitoring and more frequent eligibility reviews has a much larger effect of welfare dependency than the actual sanctioning of the non-complaint. People review their options and marshalled their resources to find or stay in work.
The welfare exit effect and welfare entry deterrence arises from mandatory work requirements from the relative non-financial rewards of working and not working having changed in favour of staying in full-time and semi-work for persistent workers temporarily on a welfare benefit.
Persistent workers gain from anticipating the onerous nature of work requirements and searching more intensively for jobs which are more stable and enduring. These job seekers may reduce their asking wage to win a lower paid but steadier job.
Seasonal and temporary jobs will be less attractive if there are work requirements. The incentive to cycle between the benefit and part-time and full-time work including seasonal and temporary jobs are reduce because work requirements make welfare receipt more onerous. Those job seekers with fewer outside of the workforce obligations such as young children are the most likely to move to (stable) full-time work because of work requirements.
A work requirement as a condition for a welfare benefit receive unambiguously increases net labour supply and reduces the number of people relying on the welfare system now and into the future.
The number of people working increase and some leave welfare rather than comply with the mandatory work programmes. Work requirements make welfare receipt unambiguously less attractive and will close the gap between earning full-time wages and the net rewards of not working or part-time work and partial benefit receipt.
There was a more than 60% reduction in welfare caseloads after the 1996 federal welfare reform in the USA that introduced work requirement and five year lifetime federal welfare eligibility time limits on a national basis. In the four decades preceding the 1996 welfare reform, the number of Americans on welfare had never significantly decreased.
The gains in U.S. employment after the 1996 Federal welfare reform were largest among the single mothers previously thought to be most disadvantaged: young (ages 18-29), mothers with children aged under seven, high school drop-outs, and black and Hispanic mothers. These low-skilled single mothers in the USA were thought to face the greatest barriers to employment.
The U.S. literature has many competing estimates of the relative effects of work requirements, lifetime time limits and a far more generous earned income tax credit (EITC). It is agreed that work requirements and time limits reduced entry into welfare caseloads. The relative importance of time limits, work mandates and greater EITC generosity for exits is more disputed.
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) had a more complex experimental design that allowed separate evaluation of the mandatory welfare-to-work program and the lower benefit reduction rate. The results indicated that the lower benefit abatement rates appear to have had little labour supply effect. The increase in labour supply seems to have come almost entirely from the mandatory welfare-to-work program and its associated sanctions.
Much was initially made in the US empirical literature of the strong state of the American economy in the 1990s as an explanation for part of the drop in welfare caseloads. The relevance of this faded when welfare caseloads did not increase again when the economy deteriorated after 2007 in the USA.
Recent Comments