Chinese tax residents bought 321 Auckland properties (29.5 per cent of the total); Australian tax residents purchased 312 Auckland properties (28.6 per cent).
Buying 9 more houses than the Australians = dominating housing market says @nzherald
10 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking Tags: antiforeign bias, housing affordability, land supplied, rational irrationality
@JulieAnneGenter Twitter feed rules on NZ as top #taxhaven @JordNZ #Panamapapers
10 May 2016 Leave a comment
With friends like these, the #UBI will not live to face its enemies @jordNZ
09 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, public economics, rentseeking Tags: universal basic income
Running around saying that Universal Basic Income will make work optional leaves open the question of who will be the suckers who actually do the work and pay enormous taxes to fund the idyllic lifestyle of the bohemian rest.
![]()
Source: What If Everybody Didn’t Have to Work to Get Paid? – The Atlantic.
Did top income earners pay less income tax after @JohnKeyMP was elected?
08 May 2016 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: superstar wagers, superstars, top 1%, top incomes
#NewZealand’s top 1% is getting even lazier under neoliberal @johnkeyMP
07 May 2016 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, Leftover Left, reactionary left, superstar wagers, superstars, top 1%
The share of incomes of the top 1% in New Zealand has not increased since the 1950s – they are just bone lazy at extracting labour surplus.
Veteran left-wing grumbler Max Rashbrooke was good enough to collect Inland Revenue Data data that show that getting even lazier under right-wing government elected in 2008. Their share of taxable income has dropped from 9% when labour lost power to 8.4% now. These figures exclude capital gains.
How green art thou? #buswaysforelectriccars not #BuswaysForBuses
06 May 2016 Leave a comment
in energy economics, environmental economics, environmentalism, politics - New Zealand, transport economics, urban economics Tags: busways, do gooders, electric cars, expressive politics, global warming, trade-offs, transport lobby
Finally have something nice to say about electric cars. They will put bus lanes to good use.
A trivial percentage of people take the bus to work In New Zealand. The government has a target of doubling electric car fleet every year (from 2000 in 2016 to 64,000 in 2021).
This decision yesterday to allow them to use busways allows us to relish in seeing environmentalists feud over which technologies are green enough to have access to priority lanes on the road such as those allocated to buses.
Which is more important? Saving the planet or saving the buses; most of them are diesel? Busways are empty at the weekends and many other times.
Does invested $1 in retrofitting saves $6 in health expenditure? @PhilTwyford @PeterDunneMP @AndrewLittleMP
05 May 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of regulation, energy economics, health economics, politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: cost benefit analysis, economics of housing, economics of insulation, energy efficiency gap, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge, valuation of life
Various bold claims have been made about the payoff from investing more in retrofitting insulation into housing. The government recently spent $600 million on such retrofitting of insulation.
https://twitter.com/PhilTwyford/status/728137160113557505
There is a private member’s bill before Parliament to introduce minimum standards for rental properties with regard to insulation and other matters. Little is by the Leader of the Opposition Andrew Little said for the consequences for rents of this additional expense to landlords.
Ian Harrison of Tail Risk Economics initially estimated that the $600 million invested in retrofitting of insulation will save barely half of that:
After correcting for this major error and taking a more realistic view of the benefit estimates in other studies, the net benefits of $630 million disappear.
The $600 million insulation investment will probably generate benefits of closer to $170 million, for an economic loss of $430 million.
After meeting with Ian, I read through the rather dull background documents behind a cost benefit analysis relied upon by the government to spend the $600 million dollars.
The most interesting part of the cost benefit analysis is most of the benefits come from fewer cardiovascular related hospitalisation of the elderly and not from respiratory diseases among children.
I found the error was far more fundamental than a incorrect transfer of a calculation between tables discussed in the first publication by Harrison. I had to read the background documents several times to understand what had been done wrong.
The cost benefit analysis for the Warm Up New Zealand Heat Smart Programme assumes that the number of elderly occupants of the newly insulated house increases by one each year and after 5 years, one of these dies but is replaced by a new elderly occupant.
We have modelled the probability of a vulnerable person avoiding mortality as a result of the intervention. The probability of this is (112.7/1000)*0.27= 0.03 (3%). We treat avoidance of mortality by treatment in each year as independent events.
The multi-year benefit calculated above would accrue based on the life years gained as a result of deaths avoided in year one.
However, we would expect these benefits to accrue in year two for different vulnerable individuals (aged 65 and over with a cardiovascular related hospitalisation in previous 18 months), and for different individuals again in every subsequent year that the treatment continues to have an effect, i.e. an on-going stream of benefits of $1,050.74 per year. This assumes a constant proportion of people aged 65+ who have recently been hospitalised with circulatory problems….( p.38).
In the first year of the new insulation, the first occupant benefits and the net present value is included in the benefit cost analysis calculation – the erroneous benefit cost analysis calculations which its authors still defend.
In the 2nd year, another elderly person moves into that same house and the same calculation is done for them. In the following year, yet another elderly person moves into the same house and the net present value calculation is repeated.
By the end of 5 years, there are 5 occupants in this house all benefiting from the same insulation investment. In the 6th year, the first elderly occupant dies to be replaced by a new elderly occupant who then gains from the insulation upgrade.
There was double counting of the number of people who benefited from the insulation as Iain Harrison explains
The analysis assumed that there was not one, but five occupants who had been hospitalised with a cardiovascular illness in the previous 18 months in each of the relevant insulated houses. There should have been only one such occupant.
The retrofitting of insulation was estimated to cost $600 million. Iain Harrison estimated the benefits to be $300 million, not $1.2 billion. That is a benefit cost ratio of 0.5.
Source: Iain Harrison, The mortality reduction benefits of insulation: the error identified.
How much do you get paid if you can pick winners? @JulieAnneGenter @simonjbridges
05 May 2016 Leave a comment
in applied price theory, comparative institutional analysis, entrepreneurship, fisheries economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: entrepreneurial alertness, hedge fund managers, industry policy, picking winners, superstar wages, superstars
Electric cars have joined the long list of mendicant mendicant businesses that have been backed by the New Zealand government of late. Picking winners again.
The payrolls of entire government departments in New Zealand are not enough to hire a single successful hedge fund manager to pick winners for their political masters. To get on the list of the top 25 hedge fund managers, you need to earn at least $300 million a year.
The 25 highest-earning hedge fund managers and traders made a combined $12 billion in 2015, slightly less than the $12.5 billion the 25 top-earning hedge fund managers together made in 2014.
Why do investment advisors sell and often give away their sage advice? If their insights were any good, they could trade on the share market before others caught on and make a killing!
I will give a personal example based on the skills of bureaucracies in picking winners. The test of my hypothesis is based on the transferability of human capital across jobs.
My graduate school professors in Japan included many retired bureaucrats from the Ministry of Finance and MITI. These agencies were heralded by Joe Stiglitz and others for picking winners and guiding Japanese companies to choose the right technologies and what to export.
The skills that my graduate school professors learned at picking winners over their careers with the Ministry of Finance and MITI in the high-growth years in the 1970s would now be available to them in their retirements to trade on their own account.
Page 32 of "An Illustrated Guide to Income" more economic #dataviz at: bit.ly/12SEI9p http://t.co/HYm0II2UNI—
Catherine Mulbrandon (@VisualEcon) May 08, 2013
My graduate school professors should quickly become very rich after retiring because of the skills they learned in picking winners while at the Ministry of Finance and MITI, which should cross over into their private share portfolios. The rich lists world-wide should be full of retired industry and finance ministry bureaucrats.
Instead, my graduate school professors took the train and bus to work and their families lived off their salaries in standard sized Japanese government apartments. All looked forward to their annual bonus of 5.15 months salary.
If governments are any good at picking winners, people should be willing to pay big time to get jobs at ministries of finance and ministries of international trade and industry to get access to their unique and highly secret skills they learn therein on how to pick winners.
I am still waiting for that tell-all book by an insider on these skills. Why is there no Picking Winners for Dummies on Amazon kindle as yet?
@jacindaardern @NZLabour’s Healthy Homes Bill will raise rents to poor tenants and students
05 May 2016 1 Comment
in David Friedman, economics of regulation, law and economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: avoiding difficult decisions, housing habitability laws, living standards, New Zealand Labour Party, offsetting, rent control, The fatal conceit, The pretense to knowledge, unintended consequences
Source: David Friedman, Chapter 1: What Does Economics Have to Do with Law?
@GarethMP is least jet-setting of the @NZGreens
28 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand Tags: green hypocrisy, Left-wing hypocrisy, New Zealand Greens, Parliamentary travel
Green MPs once again spent more than most MPs on air travel – oh, the carbon footprint! They spent considerably more on average than the Labour Party which has MPs all over the country including constituency MPs. There are no green constituency MPs. Gareth Hughes was the only Green MP to spend less than the Parliamentary all parties mean or median travel expenses for the last quarter. Indeed, he was the only Green MP to spend less than the Labour Party average spending for the last quarter on travel! Of the
Source: New Zealand Parliament – Members’ Expense Disclosure from 1 January to 31 March 2016.
Who will pay @johnkeypm’s great big new land tax?
26 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in politics - New Zealand, public economics Tags: housing affordability, land supply, land tax
A critical aspect of a land tax rarely addressed in public debate is its “economic incidence – or who actually bears the burden of the – tax as opposed to its statutory incidence, or who literally pays the tax.
John Key has floated a land tax as an option to deal with rising land prices in Auckland if a large number of buyers are foreign.
It is pretty standard public economics the elasticities of supply and demand essential to working out who actually pays tax rather than who sends the cheque.
More of the taxes paid by either the buyer or seller who is demand or supply is more inelastic; responds less to changes in price.
In the case of land, supply is looked upon as highly inelastic. Because of this lack of responsiveness of suppliers to changes in price, most to all of the tax is paid by sellers of land.
Since supply is fixed, the same amount of land is still available The owner now has a lower after-tax rental return of his land. As the Australian Treasury explains
As the capital value of the land is equal to the discounted present value of all the future expected rental returns, a lower rental return implies a one-off fall in the value of all land. Owners of land bear the incidence of the land value tax even if they sell their land in response to the tax.
This reduction in the rental value of land will mean future buyers will pay less for land. The price of land will fall in the future because returns are less after-tax.
The introduction of a land tax by John Key will mean the price of land might fall by the present value of the land tax. Zodrow explains
In principle, the economic incidence of all of these capitalization effects is on the owners of land and housing at the time of the imposition of the tax, when the effects are “capitalized” as one-time changes in the prices of these assets..
A Mall divided by different city minimum wage laws @SueMoroney @GreenCatherine
26 Apr 2016 1 Comment
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, economics of regulation, labour economics, minimum wage, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, Robert E. Lucas Tags: Alan Manning, city minimum wage laws, living wage, monopsony
The Westfield Valley Fair Mall is half in San Jose city and half in Santa Clara city. In 2012, San Jose raised its minimum wage from $8 to $10 per hour.
National Public Radio in 2014 had a brilliant broadcast on the implications of this new city minimum wage law on the Westfield Valley Fair Mall. As the broadcast said:
This change created two economic worlds within a single, large building. Employees doing more or less the same work, just steps away from each other, started making different wages.
The radio show discussed what happened on the $8 side of the Mall and then on the $10 side through interviews with employers and workers.
On the then $8 per hour minimum wage side of the Mall, employers quickly noticed that many of their employees quit to jobs elsewhere in the same Mall. These same employees found that the quality of job applicants also fell away seriously. There were noticeable differences in the personalities traits and dress standards presented by the $8 an hour job applicants and $10 an hour job applicants.
As is to be expected because information about job opportunities is costly, some of the minimum wage employees did not know that other parts of the Mall paid more.
(This change in job turnover rates and applicant pool quality subsequent to the minimum wage increase in San Jose has implications for the inequality of bargaining power between workers and employers. Minimum wage workers do keep an eye on competing opportunities and take them up when better options arise – JR aside).
Since 2012, the minimum wage rates in the Mall have changed again: Santa Clara’s minimum wage initially increased to $9 an hour – the state-wide minimum wage, which had increased from $8 per hour; San Jose’s $10.15 per hour.
Those city minimum wages were increased further this year to $11 in Santa Clara city and $10.30 in San Jose city respectively by the respective city councils.
The state-wide minimum wage in California is to increase to $15 per hour by 2020 under a law just passed. California’s current $10-per-hour minimum wage is already among the highest in the country — only Washington, DC, has a higher minimum wage at $10.50 per hour.
Getting back to what was said in the National Public Radio broadcast, the show then moved on to the Gap Store, which straddled the two city boundaries.
Source: Episode 562: A Mall Divided : Planet Money : NPR.
The Gap Store had the option of keeping a record of how much time employees spent in each city within its store and pay accordingly under each city law. The Gap raised everybody’s wage to $10.
There was then a fascinating interview with a Pretzels store owner. The question she asked herself every time she bought anything was how many pretzels se had to sell to cover the cost. She quickly concluded that she could not sell enough additional pretzels to cover the wage rise.
There is another Pretzels store just around the corner from her in the same mall but in the other city so she could not raise her prices by that much. She had a picture of that day’s menu and price list of the competing Pretzels store on her smart phone.
She instead took a cut in her profit. This flowed back to her employers because they received an annual bonus based on 15% of each year’s profit. They did not like that reduction in their bonus.
In a delicious irony, this same entrepreneur owned another Pretzels store in a different part of the Mall but which was in the other city subject to the lower minimum wage law. She owned two of the three pretzels stores in that Mall.
She solved the problem in staff morale by rotating her staff in alternate weeks between her two stores in the same Mall but different cities and paying them accordingly.
In my opinion, this NPR story is pretty much a vindication of standard microeconomics of minimum wage laws. Minimum wage workers are alert to their opportunities and take the best ones available to them but this is not perfect because of cost of information. As Manning observed in his superb book Monopsony in Motion:
That important frictions exist in the labor market seems undeniable: people go to the pub to celebrate when they get a job rather than greeting the news with the shrug of the shoulders that we might expect if labor markets were frictionless.
And people go to the pub to drown their sorrows when they lose their job rather than picking up another one straight away. The importance of frictions has been recognized since at least the work of Stigler (1961, 1962).
As George Stigler argued, information is costly to obtain in the labour market and this leads to price and wage dispersion with this variance related to the cost of searching for information. He concluded that the one-price (one-wage) market will occur only where the cost of information about the prices (wages) offered by buyers and sellers is zero.
Finally, minimum wages rises threaten the profitability of businesses and therefore their survival. That puts low-pay jobs at risk. As Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) explain in their survey paper on monopsony:
Notice also that because a binding minimum wage reduces employers’ profits when there is free entry into and exit out of the labor market, some employers will be forced to exit. Employer exit has a negative effect on total employment through the loss of exiting employer payrolls.
That is, although establishments that remain after the imposition of a minimum wage increase their employment, some employers are forced out of business.
Thus, minimum wages have two opposing effects: the employment-increasing “oligopsony” effect and the employment-reducing “exit” effect. The overall effect of a minimum wage depends on which effect dominates.
An increase in the family tax credit puts no jobs at risk and is a superior alternative to minimum wage laws. Minimum wage increases throw some low page workers onto the social scrapheap.
Some look upon these large minimum state and city wage increases as worthwhile policy experiments. As Dube said:
… 30 to 40 percent of the California workforce will get a raise … This will be a big experiment. It’s far outside of our evidence base… If you’re risk-averse, this would not be the scale at which to try things.
On the other hand, if you think that wages are really low and they’ve been low for a really long time and we can afford to take some risks, doing things at this scale will get us more evidence.
“Big experiments” to use Dube’s words such as these with state and city minimum wages laws are wrong as Robert Lucas explained in 1988:
I want to understand the connection between in the money supply and economic depressions.
One way to demonstrate that I understand this connection–I think the only really convincing way–would be for me to engineer a depression in the United States by manipulating the U.S. money supply.
I think I know how to do this, though I’m not absolutely sure, but a real virtue of the democratic system is that we do not look kindly on people who want to use our lives as a laboratory. So I will try to make my depression somewhere else.
And the beat goes on – housing prices since 1975 @PeterDunneMP @PhilTwyford
24 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in applied welfare economics, politics - New Zealand, Public Choice, rentseeking, urban economics Tags: Auckland, housing affordability, land supply, land use planning, NIMBYs, Resource Management Act, urban limits, zoning
New Zealand housing prices were pretty flat up for the two decades until the passage of the Resource Management Act (RMA) in 1993. They then soared well before any foreign buyers such as from China entered the market.
Source: International House Price Database – Dallas Fed December 2015; nominal housing prices for each country is deflated by the personal consumption deflator for that country.
Most of the housing price rises were under the watch of a Labour Government – a party which is supposed to look out for working families.
The failure of the Labour Party to nip the problem in the bud when they had a working majority in Parliament means future solutions run into the political problem that any significant increase in supply of land may push many with recent mortgages such as in Auckland into negative equity.
Since they left office in 2008, leaving land supply regulation in a mess, the approach of Labour has been political opportunism rather than supporting RMA reform.
Labour recently admitted the need to increase the supply of land, but have not put forward practical ideas to increase the supply of land.
The National Party is not much better in terms of real solutions to regulatory constraints on the supply of land.
#MorganFoundation errors about @nzinitiative’s Health of the State – part 2
23 Apr 2016 Leave a comment
in economics of media and culture, economics of regulation, health economics, politics - New Zealand Tags: anti-market bias, do gooders, meddlesome preferences, Morgan Foundation, nanny state, political psychology, rational rationality
Recent Comments