The NZ top 1% share has been steady at 8-9% since the mid-1990s. The top 1%’s share rose strongly in the USA in recent decades, from 13% in the mid-1980s to 19% in 2012.
Figure 1: Top 1% income shares, USA, New Zealand and Sweden, 1970-2012
The top 1% in New Zealand is so lazy that Sweden is overtaking it – See figure 1.
The Occupy crowd blame everything from the global financial crisis to a bad environment on growing inequality and the top 1%. Such an argument has no foundation in fact in New Zealand.
Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has not risen much in New Zealand for 20 years – See figure 2. How can the poor be getting getting poorer, ground under by the yoke of capitalism, if the rich are not getting richer. The occupy movement should apply for unemployment benefits and seek career guidance.
Figure 2: Gini coefficient New Zealand 1980-2015
Source: Bryan Perry, Household incomes in New Zealand: Trends in indicators of inequality and hardship 1982 to 2013. Ministry of Social Development (July 2014).
The last major increase in income inequality in New Zealand was in the late 1980s and early 1990s and that was followed by a long economic boom – See figure 3 .
Figure 3: Real GDP per New Zealander and Australian aged 15-64, converted to 2013 price level with updated 2005 EKS purchasing power parities, 1956-2012
This long boom was after two decades of next to no economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s in New Zealand – see figure 3 . This depression between 1974 and 1992 was New Zealand’s lost decades.
Figure 4 shows that both the lost decades of economic growth in New Zealand and the emergence of the trans-Tasman income gap the seemed to somewhat coincide with the top 1% of earners in Australia increasing their share of income from 6% to 10% of total incomes while the New Zealand top 1% sat on their hands. They are such lazy devils.
Figure 4: Top 1% income shares, USA, New Zealand and Australia, 1970-2012
Distribution of families earning below the Living Wage
Source: Taxwell
The wage rates of people of different ages
Source: Taxwell
The distribution of wages by industry
Non-wage earners is mainly self employed. Source: Taxwell
NZ’s proposed Living Wage compared to other Living Wage proposals
Source: Living Wage campaign websites, and exchange rates as at 20 September 2013
The Living Wage proposal is an ineffective way to help families with low incomes, because:
Many low income earners are people below the age of 30 who are single or part of a childless couple;
The extra earnings by parents would result in reduced tax credits or benefit payments (as they abate with higher income).
If adopted as a minimum wage, New Zealand would be out of line with other countries, and it is likely to reduce employment, particularly of younger people trying to enter the labour market.
The overall impact on poverty levels is likely to be small, but it would represent a change of focus from supporting families with children towards supporting young, single people.
The Taxpayers’ Union today launched my report, Monopoly Money, which examines the cost and case for New Zealand’s extensive corporate welfare programmes.
Figure 1: Corporate welfare, Budgets 2008/09 to 2014/15
My report, which examines the cost of corporate welfare examines government spending since the 2007/2008 budget, shows:
Since National took office, corporate welfare has cost taxpayers $1-1.4 billion ($600 – $800 per household) per year
If corporate welfare was abolished, enough money would be saved to reduce the corporate tax rate from 28% to 22.5%
If applied to personal income tax rates, the saving would allow the 30% and 33% income tax rates to be lowered to 29%
Figure 2: Corporate welfare, Budgets 2008/09 to 2014/15 by Vote
Figure 3: Distribution of total corporate welfare across votes, 2008/09 to 2014/15
Can hearts and minds be bought? A metaphorical question posed to ask whether government spending can aid counterinsurgency. In their paper, Berman et al. seek to answer this basic question using current literature, recent data and a model of counterinsurgency.
They chose Iraq for their research because it is presently significant, there is a large amount of data and most importantly, because it is characterised by insurgency and not by ‘conventional warfare’. It is this characteristic, argued by Berman et al. that will be seen more often in future conflicts that is so crucial to understand. Another important facet to note is that current ‘US Army counterinsurgency doctrine’ is not based on any social scientific theory; thereby making the need to understand insurgency more vital to aid spending.
By using current data, Berman et al. find on the whole that the correlation between reconstruction spending and violence across Iraqi districts…
Two millionaires, one on the left and one on the right, set up parties to get into Parliament in the recent New Zealand election. The millionaire of the left failed abysmally. The millionaire on the right made progress towards getting into Parliament in the 2017 election.
Each spent vast sums of money by New Zealand standards on their party:
Kim.com gave $4.5 million to his Internet – Mana party; and
Colin Craig gave about $1.5 million to his Conservative party with another millionaire giving $750,000 to the Conservative party.
By way of context, the maximum that a political party can spend on campaign expenses in the three months prior to the election is $1.1 million, plus $25,000 per electorate seat It is contesting. None of this is spent on radio and television advertising because this is allocated for free by the electoral commission based on previous election performance.
One of the major rationales for election finance regulation is to stop the rich buying elections by flooding the airways and billboards with their call to arms and buying politicians short of campaign donations:
Conventional wisdom holds that money plays a central and nefarious role in American politics.
Underlying this belief are two fundamental assumptions:
(1) elective offices are effectively sold to the highest bidder, and
(2) campaign contributions are the functional equivalent of bribes.
Campaign finance regulations are thus an attempt to hinder the operation of this political marketplace.
John Milyo
New Zealand is a good example of how difficult it is to buy votes if you’re underlying message does not work. This is a key point to remember.
The millionaire of the left, Kim.com, gave money to a far left party in New Zealand, recycled a couple of middle-aged lefties, ran a hard left campaign, and won all of 2000 extra party votes over last time out of electorate of about 2 million.
He came unstuck because his sitting electorate MP lost 3000 votes and lost his seat. If he had kept his seat, his party would have been also entitled to a List MP seat because his party won 1.3% of the party vote. Under the New Zealand system of mixed member proportional representation, if you win a seat in Parliament, you’re entitled to list seats to ensure that your representation in Parliament is equal to your party vote.
The millionaire of the right, Colin Craig, ran a socially conservative, economic nationalist campaign and won 4% of the vote. A party needs 5% of the party vote to get into Parliament if your party does not win an electorate seat.
Both of these parties that did not get into Parliament outspent the winning national party which won 60 of the 121 seats in Parliament.
The failure of Kim.com and Colin Craig to buy their way Parliament should be no surprise. Most systematic studies find no effect of marginal campaign spending on the electoral success of candidates.
Levitt noted that previous studies of congressional spending have found a large positive effect of challenger spending, but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending. Those studies did not adequately control for inherent differences in vote-getting ability across candidates.
His paper examined elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion; differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes.
His estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies. Campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes, regardless of who does the spending.
Jeff Milyo also found that a more systematic analysis of the electoral fortunes of wealthy candidates found no significant association between electoral or fund-raising success and personal wealth. For example, see Jeffrey Milyo and Timothy Groseclose, “The Electoral Effects of Incumbent Wealth,” Journal of Law and Economics 42 (1999): 699–722.
A range of rich candidates have attempted to buy Senate seats and gubernatorial posts with little success if they were themselves unappealing candidates.
The best explanation to date for the minor effect of campaign spending on electoral success is competent candidates are adept at both convincing contributors to give money and convincing voters to give their vote.
The finding that campaign spending and electoral success are highly correlated exaggerates the importance of money to a candidate’s chances of winning.
Campaign donors give more money to the expected winners because they want to be on the winning side. What lobbyist doesn’t want to be that the best new friend of the incoming minister?
Legislators tend to act in accordance with the interests of donors, but this is not because of a quid pro quo. Instead, donors tend to give to like-minded candidates. See Steven Levitt, “Who are PACs Trying to Influence with Contributions: Politicians or Voters?” Economics and Politics 10, no. 1 (1998): 19–36.
It is a much surer thing to give donations to a party that already agrees with you, rather than persuade someone to change their minds with campaign donations. That is a much less certain bet.
Studies of legislative behaviour indicate that the most important determinants of an incumbent’s voting record are constituent interests, party, and personal ideology. These three factors explain nearly all of the variation in incumbents’ voting records. See Steven Levitt, “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Party Affiliation, Voter Preferences and Senator Ideology,” American Economic Review 86 (1996): 425–441.
As an aside, the hard left campaign was instructive in another regard. The hard left honestly believes that there is a large number of people out willing to vote hard left if only their message was properly funded and got a hearing. These would be hard left voters are currently parking their vote elsewhere, such as with the right wing parties, apparently.
A massively funded hard left campaign in New Zealand won 1.2% of the party vote. In the 2011 election, the same hard left party, when woefully underfunded, won 1.1% of the party vote. Getting the message out appears to have absolutely no effect on the party vote of the hard left. The median voter theory rules.
The Conservative party was much more successful because the Christian parties in New Zealand usually get about 4% of the vote, except when they’re fighting with each other over who was following the Word of God better, which is rather common.
Furthermore, about 10-15% of the New Zealand election is both socially conservative and economically nationalist. They used to be called working-class Tories. Much of this vote currently votes for the New Zealand First Party– a one-man party – and its leader will be 72 at the next election.
New Zealand’s NZX 50 Index increased 1.1 percent, driven higher by power-company stocks, after John Key won a third term as prime minister. Key, a former head of foreign exchange at Merrill Lynch & Co., led his National party to a 48 percent victory in New Zealand’s weekend election, securing the first single-party majority in the South Pacific nation’s parliament since at least 1996. The main opposition Labour Party, which wanted to introduce a tax on capital gains and raise the minimum wage, suffered its worst defeat since 1922.
Perhaps Labour got their ideas from Paul Krugman.
When right-of-center parties are elected, they generally disappoint. Although right-of-center economists favor free markets, most conservative politicians do not. Abe (Japan) and Modi (India) are two recent examples of conservatives who promised reforms and failed to come through (thus far). Fortunately New Zealand is different.
Why Evolution is True is a blog written by Jerry Coyne, centered on evolution and biology but also dealing with diverse topics like politics, culture, and cats.
In Hume’s spirit, I will attempt to serve as an ambassador from my world of economics, and help in “finding topics of conversation fit for the entertainment of rational creatures.”
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