10 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied price theory, applied welfare economics, comparative institutional analysis, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, entrepreneurship, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), income redistribution, labour economics, labour supply, macroeconomics, Marxist economics, poverty and inequality, Public Choice, public economics, rentseeking
Tags: British disease, entrepreneurial alertness, Eurosclerosis, France, German unification, Germany, growth of government, sick man of Europe, social insurance, Sweden, taxation and entrepreneurship, taxation and investment, taxation and labour supply, welfare state
The Washington Centre for Equitable Growth recently tweeted that inequality harms growth in the USA as compared to Sweden, France, Germany and the UK. It was relying on some dodgy OECD research.
The Washington Centre for Equitable Growth did not check their inequality ratios they tweeted against trends in economic growth and economic policy since 1970, which I have reproduced in figure 1. Germany is not included in figure 1 because German data on growth is thrown askew by German unification.
Figure 1: Real GDP per British, French and Swede aged 15-64, 2014 US$ (converted to 2014 price level with updated 2011 PPPs), 1.9 per cent detrended, 1970-2013
Source: Computed from OECD Stat Extract and The Conference Board. 2015. The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, May 2015, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
Figure 1 shows that France has been in a long-term decline since the late 1970s despite the blessings of a more equal society than the USA as championed by the Washington Centre for Equitable Growth. In figure 1, a flat line is growth in real GDP per working age person, PPP, at the same rate as the USA for the 20th century, which was 1.9% per year. A falling line in figure 1 indicates growth of less than 1.9% while a rising line indicates growth in real GDP per working age person, PPP, in excess of 1.9%. In figure 1, France hardly ever grew at the trend rate of growth for the USA of 1.9% per year and was frequently well below that rate.
Sweden tells a slightly different story in figure 1 because of regime change in the early 1990s when Sweden adopted more liberal economic policies where taxes and government spending were reduced:
The rapid growth of the state in the late 1960s and 1970s led to a large decline in Sweden’s relative economic performance. In 1975, Sweden was the 4th richest industrialised country in terms of GDP per head. By 1993, it had fallen to 14th.
That regime change reversed a long economic decline since 1970 under the egalitarian policies of the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Under the Swedish Social Democratic Party, Sweden was almost always growing at less than the trend rate of growth of the USA, which was 1.9%. That position reversed only when there was a turn away from big government and high taxes.
Figure 1 tells a similar story for the British economy: a long economic decline in the 1970s when Britain was the sick man of Europe. Under Thatchernomics, Europe had a long economic boom for 20 years or more – see figure 1.
In the 1970s, under the high taxes of the Heath, Callaghan and Wilson administrations, as figure 1 shows, Britain was the sick man of Europe. With the election of the Thatcher Government, Britain soon grew at better than the US trend growth rate for nearly 20 years through few exceptions.
07 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied welfare economics, fiscal policy, labour economics, politics - Australia, politics - New Zealand, politics - USA, poverty and inequality, welfare reform
Tags: Denmark, Finland, life expectancies, Norway, Sweden, welfare state
05 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in currency unions, economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, fiscal policy
Tags: British disease, British economy, Eurosclerosis, France, Germany, Italy, sick man of Europe, Sweden, Swedosclerosis
Figure 1 shows stark differences between Sweden, France, Italy and the UK since 1970 in departures from trend growth rates of 1.9% in real GDP per working age person, PPP. Italy did quite OK until 2000 growing at about the trend growth rate of 1.9% after which it fell into a hole so deep that it barely notice the onset of the global financial crisis. Sweden really had been the sick man of Europe until it turned its back on high taxing, welfare state socialism in the early 1990s. France has been in a long decline so much so that the global financial crisis is hard to pick up in the acceleration in its long decline in the mid-1990s. Figure 1 also shows Britain did very well, both under the neoliberal horrors of Thatcherism and the betrayals by Tony Blair of a true Labour Party platform. The UK grew at above the trend annual growth to 1.9% for most of the period from the early 1980s to 2007. The UK has done not so well since the onset of the global financial crisis.
Figure 1: Real GDP per Swede, French, British and Italian aged 15-64, 2014 US$ (converted to 2014 price level with updated 2011 PPPs), 1.9 per cent detrended, 1970-2013
Source: Computed from OECD StatExtract and The Conference Board. 2015. The Conference Board Total Economy Database™, May 2015, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/
Note: When the line is flat, the economy is growing at its trend annual growth rate. A falling line means below trend annual growth; a rising line means of above trend annual growth. Detrended with values used by Edward Prescott.
German data was not in figure 1 because German unification threw all of its data into disarray for long-term comparison purposes.
03 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great depression, great recession, history of economic thought, law and economics, macroeconomics, monetary economics
Tags: bank panics, bank runs, banking crises, currency crises, Thomas Sargent
02 Aug 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, business cycles, economic growth, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), great recession, history of economic thought, macroeconomics, monetarism, monetary economics
Tags: Brad Delong, fiscal multiplier, fiscal stimulus, Larry Summers, New Keynesian macroeconomics, Thomas Sargent
27 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in currency unions, economic history, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, labour economics, labour supply
Tags: ageing society, demographics crisis, economics of retirement, female labour force participation, Greece, Italy, male labour force participation, old age pensions, older workers, Portugal, social insurance, Social Security, Spain, taxation and labour supply
Figure 1 shows a relatively distinct pattern for men in the PIGs. Portugal aside, there has been a long decline retirement ages. This is different to the Anglo-Saxon countries where effective retirement ages have been increasing in recent years for men.
Figure 1: average effective retirement age (5-year averages), men, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, 1970 – 2012
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
Figure 2 shows that apart from Greece, that after a long decline in female effective retirement ages, there was something the rebound, especially in Italy and Portugal. In Greece, the rebound was in the 80s, followed by a resumption of decline from the mid 90s.
Figure 2: average effective retirement age (5-year averages), women, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, 1970 – 2012
Source: OECD Pensions at a Glance.
25 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in budget deficits, business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, global financial crisis (GFC), international economics, law and economics, macroeconomics, monetary economics, property rights
Tags: capital controls, capital flight, Greece, labour exodus, sovereign defaults
19 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, economic growth, economic history, fiscal policy, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: Celtic Tiger, equilibrium unemployment rate, Eurosclerosis, Germany, Ireland, Italy, natural unemployment rate, Rance, Spain
Figure 1 shows large contrasts in time path of equilibrium unemployment rates. For example, French and Italian equilibrium unemployment rates haven’t changed much since about 1986.
Figure 1: equilibrium unemployment rates, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain, 1968 – 2016
Source: OECD Economic Outlook June 2015 via OECD StatExtract..
Figure 1 also shows some fortuitous ups and downs in the German equilibrium unemployment rate. This estimate was available only from after German unification.
The equilibrium German unemployment rate rose from 6% to above 8% on the eve of the global financial crisis. Fortunately for Germany, major labour market reforms brought the equilibrium unemployment rate down as Germany moved into the global financial crisis.
The Spanish equilibrium unemployment rate had been terrible since about 1980, started to fall in the 1990s, then skyrocketed even before the onset of the global financial crisis – see figure 1.
There have been ups and downs in the Irish equilibrium unemployment rate – see figure 1. It was as high as 14% at the end of the Irish great depression of the 1970s and 1980s. The equilibrium Irish unemployment rate was 8% at the heyday of the Celtic tiger then slowly rose in the lead up to the global financial crisis.
17 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in applied welfare economics, budget deficits, comparative institutional analysis, constitutional political economy, currency unions, economic growth, economic history, economics of regulation, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, income redistribution, macroeconomics, Marxist economics, Public Choice, rentseeking
Tags: Greece, growth of government, Margaret Thatcher, size of government
15 Jul 2015
by Jim Rose
in business cycles, currency unions, economic growth, Euro crisis, fiscal policy, job search and matching, labour economics, macroeconomics, unemployment
Tags: ageing society, demographic crisis, economic reform, employment law, employment regulation, Greece, labour market deregulation, Margaret Thatcher, pension reform, privatisation, Roger Douglas, social insurance, sovereign bailouts, sovereign defaults, welfare state
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